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Abstract
We investigate the effects of extending the coverage of social security to uncovered elderly
individuals in the informal sector in developing countries. We use a stochastic overlapping
generations framework and incorporate important characteristics of developing countries
including family transfers and a sizeable informal sector. Our calibrated model predicts
that the introduction of a moderately sized social assistance program decreases steady state
output by up to 3.25% and labor supply by up to 2.5%. In contrast to literature focusing on
developed countries, the model predicts that extending the coverage of the social security
system results in welfare gains for low income households. This result indicates that the
insurance function and the redistribution function of the social assistance program dominate
the distortionary effects in an environment without adequate risk sharing mechanisms and
high inequality.
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1 Introduction
A shortage of risk sharing mechanisms against longevity risk is an important issue in developing
countries. According to Palacious and Pallares-Mirallets (2000) social security systems cover
only a small part of the population. For example, the coverage rates of social security systems
are less than 10% in low income countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia and rarely
exceed half of the working population in middle income countries in Latin America.1 Mean-
while, financial markets are underdeveloped and do not provide reliable financial instruments
to insure people at higher ages. It is therefore not surprising that in developing countries family
transfer payments are the most important source of income for the elderly next to labor income
(World-Bank (1994)).
The family transfer system — briefly summarized as parents supporting their young chil-
dren and becoming recipients of support from their children when old — is widespread across
developing countries. Frankenberg and Karoly (1995), Knodel and Debavalya (1997), Franken-
berg and Kuhn (2004), and Cox and Jimenez (2006) provide evidence about the importance
of the family transfer system in developing countries. Although the family transfer system
has the advantage of eliminating source of the moral hazard and adverse selection associated
standard insurance programs, the family transfer system fails to provide enough support for
the old generation. A major weakness of the family transfer system is that it fails to pool risk
efficiently over different families. Besides, the family transfer system has been weakened due
to rapid changes in the social and economic environment in developing countries2. Moreover,
as societies age, the family transfer system will come under pressure as parents have to be
supported by their children for a longer period of time.
Being left without sufficient income, many elderly have to stay in the labor force until very
high ages. The development literature introduced the term “ceaseless toil” to describe the fact
that the elderly have to work as long as they are physically capable. Evidence of very high
1We define coverage as the fraction of the working population participating in a contributory social security
program. This program then pays pensions to retired participating workers.
2 It is not unreasonable to assume that the erosion of family ties that has been observed in western societies
can also advance to less developed countries. For a study on the evolution of attitudes towards the family in the
United States compare Thornton and Young-DeMarco (2001).
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rates of labor force participation of the elderly has been found in China (Benjamin, Brand and
Fan (2003)), Indonesia (McKee (2006)), and Vietnam (Tran (2007)).
Since private markets and the family transfer system have failed to become adequate sources
of insurance in developing countries, a natural question to ask is, whether the government
should step in and insure the elderly. Some international development organizations have
lobbied for an immediate public intervention to protect the elderly in developing countries (e.g.
see ILO (2002)). Meanwhile, several developing countries like Brazil, India, and South Africa
have already started their own social assistance/pension programs for uncovered old people.
Currently, more and more developing countries consider instituting similar programs.3
The social assistance program is a component of the social security system. One of the major
benefits of social security is that it provides avenues for risk sharing, which is welfare increasing.
On the other hand, social security distorts savings and labor supply decisions, which results
in welfare losses. The adverse effects of public transfer programs have been well documented.
In pure life-cycle frameworks, Diamond (1965) establishes that pay-as-you-go social security
lowers the steady state capital stock because social security redistributes away from young
agents with higher marginal propensities to save to old agents with lower marginal propensities
to save. More recent literature explores the magnitude of these effects. In large scale determ-
inistic life-cycle models, Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) find that social security substantially
decreases capital accumulation. Since there is no insurance role played by social security in a
deterministic framework, the introduction of social security in the Auerbach-Kotlikoff model
always results in welfare losses. The literature therefore extended the deterministic Auerbach-
Kotlikoff setup by adding various sources of uncertainty. Hubbard and Judd (1987) introduce
borrowing restrictions and random lifetime and find that in a full general equilibrium model,
there is almost no welfare gain from social security programs. Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu and
Jones (1995) add labor earnings uncertainty to the previous model and find that social security
improves welfare. This result is due to eliminating the economy’s dynamic inefficiency. After
Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu and Joines (1999) introduce land as a fixed factor of production
3See Palacious and Sluchynsky (2006) for an overview of social pension programs in developing countries.
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which rules out dynamic inefficiency, they find no beneficial role of social security anymore.
The effects of social security have also been analyzed in models with altruism. In his seminal
work, Barro (1974) shows that private transfers can neutralize the effect of public transfers and
public debt when a bequest motive is operative (Ricardian equivalence). In a quantitative
study, Fuster (1999) finds that an altruistic framework mitigates the crowding-out effect of
social security on capital stock. Fuster, Imrohoroglu and Imrohoroglu (2003) develop a similar
model with inelastic labor supply and show that the insurance role played by social security
dominates the crowding-out effects on capital stock. Fuster, Imrohoroglu and Imrohoroglu
(2007) extend their previous work to include labor/leisure choice and find that individuals
prefer to be born into an economy without social security mainly due to efficiency gains from
removing distortions on labor supply.4
In general, the literature does not support the expansion of social security systems because
crowding-out effects tend to dominate the insurance role of social security. The introduction of
a social assistance program in developing countries is therefore a controversial idea. However, in
the context of developing countries social assistance programs play two important roles. First,
social assistance programs are an important source of insurance. Second, social assistance
programs provide an instrument to redistribute income to poor informal sector workers. Social
assistance programs can therefore lead to significant welfare gains if the insurance function and
the redistribution function dominate the crowding-out effects.
Although there is a substantial literature on social security systems in developed countries,
less attention has been given to social security reforms in developing countries. So far the liter-
ature has focused on empirical and microeconomic analysis (e.g. see Cox and Jimenez (1992),
Cox and Jimenez (1995), Jensen (2003), Filho (2004), McKee (2006) and Tran (2007)) rather
than macroeconomic analysis. We believe that it is essential to evaluate such programs in a
macroeconomic framework because a social assistance program makes up a significant share of
the government budget and has impacts on significant parts of the population in developing
countries. In addition, we believe that it is important to study the effects of social security pro-
4For an excellent literature survey of unfunded social security see Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu and Jones (1999).
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grams in a model incorporating the main features of economic systems in developing countries
such as a sizeable informal sector, incomplete financial markets, segmented labor markets, high
income inequality, low coverage rates of public social security, and a large family transfer sys-
tem. Incorporating these features will result in new economic insights and policy implications.
The paper, therefore, is a first attempt in that research area. In particular, we focus on quan-
tifying the crowding-out effects of introducing a social assistance program to informal sector
workers, who are not covered by a contributory social security system and rely wholly on family
transfers. We are particularly interested in studying the effects on family transfers, bequests,
savings, labor supply, and the wealth distribution and in analyzing the welfare consequences.
We are also interested in comparing the effects under alternative financing schemes.
We use a two-sector overlapping generations economy with two-sided altruism and compet-
itive firms. The setup of the household sector is similar to Laitner (1992) and Fuster (1999).
Parents and children form a decision unit called a household in which resources are pooled
and decisions are made jointly. A sequence of households in a family line, which is linked to-
gether through skill transmission and a bequest motive, form a household dynasty. Households
face demographic and occupational shocks which are uninsurable. Deviating from the previous
studies we introduce two production sectors, a formal and an informal sector, and a double-
standard social security system. The two production sectors differ with respect to technology
and the quality of labor inputs. The social security system is only available to formal sector
workers. The social security system is financed by the government. The government taxes con-
sumption, labor income, and capital income to balance its budget each period. We calibrate
the model to match certain characteristics of Brazil. In our policy experiment, we study the
effects of varying the size of social assistance programs.
As predicted in previous literature, we find that the public social pension program crowds
out capital stock and aggregate labor supply. The model shows that the introduction of a
social assistance program with a 50% replacement rate decreases output by up to 3.25% and
labor supply by up to 2.5%. The magnitude of the crowding-out effects depends substantially
on the tax that is used to finance the expansion. In addition, the function that the social
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assistance program is effective is completely determining labor force participation by very old
(> 75) in the informal sector. Moreover, the model has an interesting implication on welfare.
In our calibrated economy, it turns out that the insurance- and redistribution function of the
social assistance program outweigh the crowding-out effects, so that we find welfare gains for
recipients of social assistance benefits. This presents a contrast to the findings in Fuster,
Imrohoroglu and Imrohoroglu (2007) who calibrate to the U.S. economy. Our results imply
that incorporating crucial characteristics of developing countries is important, qualitatively as
well as quantitatively, to evaluate the impacts of social security reforms in those countries.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we set up the model and define
equilibrium. Section 3 describes the calibration. Section 4 contains the discussion of policy
reforms and results. Section 5 is devoted to sensitivity analysis. We conclude in section 6.
The Appendix contains all tables and figures. The Technical Appendix presents the solution
method, the solution algorithm, the construction of efficiency profiles, and the tables from the
sensitivity analysis.5
2 Model
2.1 Environment
Production Sectors. The economy consists of two distinct production sectors. Sector one,
the informal sector, is populated by low productivity firms and sector two, the formal sector,
is populated by high productivity firms. Both sectors produce a common final consumption
good. The production technologies are Cobb-Douglas in both sectors
Y set = A
se (Kset )
αse (Hset )
1−αse ,
where Ase > 0, αse ∈ (0, 1) and se = {F, I} which denotes formal and informal sectors. Capital
Kse depreciates at rate δse each period and Hse is aggregate human capital in sector se. We
5The Technical Appendix is available on the authors’ website at:
http://mypage.iu.edu/~chtran/Research/sscApp.pdf
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impose AF > AI , so that the formal sector is more productive than the informal sector. Each
sector is assumed to use a certain type of labor input. Physical capital, however, is assumed
to move freely across sectors. The aggregate final consumption good is the sum of formal and
informal sector production so that
Yt = Y
F
t + Y
I
t .
The economy is assumed to grow exogenously at constant rate g.
Population and Living Arrangements. The population consists of 2× J overlapping
generations and is normalized to 1 at any point in time. Variable J denotes the number of
periods that children overlap with their parents. The population grows exogenously at rate n
and the survival probability (conditional on surviving to age j − 1) is spj. The demographic
structure of the population is assumed to be stationary so that the population share of the
age cohorts is time invariant. After detrending with the growth rate of the population, the
population share µj is recursively defined as
µj =
spj
(1 + n)
µj−1.
Individuals live at most 2J periods. Individuals experience two stages of living arrangements.
In the first stage of life we call the agents children and in the second stage of life we call them
parents. That is, individuals are children from period 1 to J and become parents when they are
J+1 periods old. At that age their parent has died and their own children become economically
active. Thus, individuals overlap with their parents in the first J periods and they overlap with
their own children in the last J periods of their life.
Individuals are assumed to be altruistic towards their children and their parents (two-sided
altruism). Parents are altruistic towards their children in the sense that parents value the
utility of their children. This is independent of whether the parent is alive or not. Therefore,
parents transfer wealth to their children while they are alive (intervivos transfers). Additional
transfers are made via accidental bequests if parents die early before they reach age 2J and
intended bequests if they reach age 2J .
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Children are also altruistic towards their parents and can transfer wealth to ensure the well
being of their parents. Hence, individuals derive utility not only from their own consumption
and leisure but also from the well-being of their parents and children. In uncertain environ-
ments, two-sided altruism generates a risk sharing mechanism across generations, which is also
called family insurance.
In each period the surviving and economically active members of a family form a decision
unit called “household”. Depending on their demographic structure, households are classified
into one of three groups. Group 1 households are made up of parents and children, group
2 households are parent only households, and group 3 households consist of children only. If
parents and children survive, they pool resources and solve a joint utility maximization problem.
This is the simplest way to incorporate two-sided altruism.6 If children do not survive, parents
run households of their own and the family line stops after parents have died. If parents die
early, children take over and become a child only household. At age J +1, children themselves
become new parents and start a new household with their own children. They again pool their
resources and jointly solve a new household optimization problem.
The households of group 1 last for J periods until the parents die at age 2J. During J
periods, a household from group 1 could change its state to either group 2 if their children die
or to group 3 if parents die. Meanwhile, the parent-only of child-only households of group 2
and 3 cannot change their type within the next J periods. The transition probability matrix
that describes these movements between groups is given by
Ω(gj , gj+1) =

sppJ+jsp
k
j sp
p
J+j
(
1− spkj
)
(1− sppJ+j)
(
1− spkj
)
0 sppJ+j 0
0 0 spkj
 ,
where gj = 1, 2, or 3 and sp
p
J+j and sp
k
j are survival probabilities of a parent and children,
respectively.
6 If we assume that parents and children maximize different objective functions, a strategic game between
parents and children will arise. Solving models that incorporate such games requires a more complicated solution
technique. Nishiyama (2002) provides more details on this.
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Household preferences are the sum of preferences of parents and m children during the J
periods in which they overlap. These expected preferences are expressed as
Wh = E
J∑
j=1
βj−1
{
j∏
i=1
spki,tu
(
ckj,t, l
k
j,t
)
+m
J+j∏
i=1
sppi,tu
(
cpJ+j,tl
p
J+j,t
)}
, (1)
where superscripts p denotes parents and k denotes kids, j is the child’s age, t is calendar time,
J + j is the parent’s age, β is the discount rate, c denotes consumption, l denotes leisure and
the period consumption-leisure utility function u (c, l) has the usual properties.
Skill Endowment and Job Assignment. When agents become economically active
they are endowed with either low or high skills. If individuals have high skills, they will work
in the formal sector, otherwise they will work in the informal sector. Formal sector workers
have higher income and participate in a pay-as-you-go social security program. Informal sector
workers have lower income and no access to social security. Individuals are not allowed to
choose their working sectors and they cannot move between sectors. However, their children
have the chance to be endowed with a different skill and therefore they are able to switch to
a different working sector7. The probability to be endowed with a job in either the formal or
informal sector depends on the current working sector of the parents. That is, sector mobility
is allowed across generations and follows a simple two-state Markov process with the transition
probability matrix given by
Π
(
sep, sek
)
=
 piI,I piI,F
piF,I piF,F
 ,
where pise,se′ is the probability to get a job in sector se
′ conditional on the parents’ working
sector se. Household dynasties are heterogeneous in the composition of the respective working
sectors of parents and children which results in four different household types, (F,F ) , (F, I) ,
(I, F ) , and (I, I), where the first letter denotes the occupational sector of the parent and the
second the occupational sector of their children.
7Since skill and working sector are interchangeable in our setup, we use either “sector” or “skill” from now
on.
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Individuals are endowed with one unit of time each period which is allocated to leisure or
work. An individual’s effective labor supply in each period is given by hij = e
i
j
(
1− lij
)
, where
hij is the human capital (or effective labor) of individual i at age j, e
i
j is the efficiency unit and
lij denotes the amount of leisure consumed.
There is a minimum mandatory retirement age of Jw,equivalent to age 65, for formal sector
workers. Upon reaching this age they can draw benefits from pension schemes. Formal sector
retirees are allowed to continue working in the informal sector even when they receive pension
or transfer payments. Jw is also the eligible age for informal sector workers to participate in a
social assistance program that we introduce later in our policy experiment.
Household Dynasty. The sequence of households of parents, children, grandchildren etc.
in a family line defines a household dynasty. Each individual of a generation in the dynasty
participates in two consecutive decision making units (or households) one with their parents
and one with their children. The expected utility of a dynasty given the household starts from
generation 0 with a parent working in sector sep0 and children working in sector se
k
1 is given
by8
∞∑
h=0
Π
(
seph, se
k
h+1
)[
(θβ)
1
J
]h
Wh, (2)
where h is the generation age in the household dynasty and θ is an altruism parameter that
governs how much the current household values the utility of the next household. If parents
die before reaching age 2J , the surviving children still live in a household without parents until
the age of J and then start a new household with their own children. If all children are dead,
parents live alone until they die, then the family line breaks.
The model combines features of both the OLG and the infinite horizon framework. Skill
transmission and two-sided altruism generate a household dynasty, that essentially introduces
the infinite horizon framework. On the other hand, each individual has a random finite lifetime
overlapping with her parents and her children and the demographic shock could break family
lines with a certain probability which introduces the life-cycle framework. When the altruism
8To save on notation we drop time subscript t but we do not restrict our setup to steady states only.
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parameter θ = 0, the model becomes a pure life-cycle model.
Government and Social Security. The government runs a social security system includ-
ing a contributory public pension program and a non-contributory social assistance program.
The public pension program is not universal. Only workers in the formal sector who pay a
social security tax when young are entitled to draw pensions when old. Meanwhile, informal
sector workers who do not pay social security taxes when they are young are prohibited from
collecting pension benefits. Pension payments to the old pensioners are defined as a function of
current wage rates in the formal sector wF , average effective labor h¯F over the working periods
of the formal sector worker, and a replacement rate ΨF . The functional form is
Pen = ΨFwF h¯F .
As a policy experiment we model a social assistance program targeted to elderly workers in the
informal sector, who are not covered by the public pension program. The individual lump-sump
transfer/social pension is calculated based on the following formula
T = ΨIwI h¯I ,
where ΨI , wI and h¯I denote the replacement rate, the wage rate and the average effective labor
in the informal sector, respectively. The replacement rate ΨI is a measure of the generosity of
the social assistance program. Government debt is assumed to be a constant fraction of final
output
B = ∆BY.
Residual government expenditure is given as a fraction of final output
G = ∆GY.
The government collects a social security tax, a labor income tax, a capital income tax, and a
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consumption tax to finance pensions for formal sector retirees, lump-sum transfers to informal
sector workers, debt service, and general government consumption. The government budget
constraint is assumed to be balanced each period.
2.2 Household Problem
Individual members of the household have different incomes depending on their working time,
age-dependent labor productivity and employment sector. The income of economically active
children ykj at age j is defined as
ykj =

(
1− τFL − τSS
) (
1− lkj
)
eFj w
F
j if se
k = F,(
1− τ IL
) (
1− lkj
)
eIjw
I
j if se
k = I,
where τFL and τ
I
L denote the labor tax rates in the formal and informal sectors, respectively
and τSS is the social security tax, which is paid by formal sector workers only. Since it is much
easier to evade taxes in the informal sector, the labor income tax rate in the formal sector is
assumed to be higher than in the informal sector, τFL > τ
I
L. Expression (1− l
k) denotes labor
supply, esej is the labor efficiency unit of skill se at age j, and h
k
j =
(
1− lkj
)
esej is effective
labor, so that
(
1− lkj
)
esej w
se
j is gross labor earning income at age j.
The income of parents ypJ+j, including wage income and pensions, is summarized as
ypJ+j =


(
1− τFL − τSS
) (
1− lpJ+j
)
eFJ+jw
F
j if J + j ≤ Jw(
1− τ IL
) (
1− lpJ+j
)
eIJ+jw
I
j + Pen
i
J+j if J + j > Jw
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ if sep = F,

(
1− τ IL
) (
1− lpJ+j
)
eIJ+jw
I
j if J + j ≤ Jw(
1− τ IL
) (
1− lpJ+j
)
eIJ+jw
I
j + T
i
J+j if J + j > Jw
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ if sep = I,
where
(
1− τFL − τSS
) (
1− lpJ+j
)
eFJ+jw
F
j is the net labor income if parents work in the formal
sector. When parents who work in the formal sector reach their mandatory retirement age,
they have to retire and become eligible to receive pensions PenJ+j. They can earn additional
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income if they decide to work in the informal sector during retirement. Hence, the labor and
pension income of a formal sector retiree is given by
(
1− τ IL
)(
1− lpJ+j
)
eIJ+jw
I
j + PenJ+j . If
formal sector retirees choose not to participate in labor market, that is
(
1− lpJ+j
)
= 0, then
there is no labor income. Informal sector workers can work as long as they are alive and want
to work. When they are older than the mandatory minimum retirement age, informal sector
workers receive additional income from a social assistance program TJ+j so that their total
income is
(
1− τ IL
) (
1− lpJ+j
)
eIJ+jw
I
j + TJ+j.
Individuals are endowed with one unit of time each period so that leisure of parents and
children lies in 0 < lpj , l
k
j ≤ 1. When l = 1, individuals choose not to work.
The growth-adjusted household budget constraint is given by
(1 + τC)
(
ξkj c
k
j + ξ
p
jc
p
J +j
)
+ (1 + g)aj+1 = Raj + ξ
p
jy
p
j + ξ
k
jy
k
J+j, for j = 1, ...J, (3)
where ξkj is an index function that is equal tom = (1 + n)
J if children are alive and 0 otherwise9,
while ξpj is an index function equal to 1 if parents are alive and 0 otherwise. Variable aj denotes
the household’s asset holding at beginning of age j and aj+1 is the asset holding in next period.
Expression g is the exogenous economic growth rate, which is the same for both sectors. Finally,
aj ≥ 0 is a borrowing constraint.
Let Vj (aj,Φj) be the indirect utility of a household at age j given state variables aj and
Φj =
{
sep, sek, ξpj , ξ
k
j
}
, including occupational composition and demographic structure of the
household. A household in a dynasty starts with some initial assets in the form of bequests
received from the previous household and then chooses consumption, leisure and savings to
maximize its indirect utility given its state variables each period. During the last period a
household with children alive maximizes not only its utility but also the expected utilities of
the next households and therefore leaves bequests to the next household in the dynasty. The
9We assume that children all either survive or die.
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household problem can be defined recursively in terms of a Bellman equation as
Vj (aj ,Φj) = max
{ckj ,lkj ,c
p
J +j
,l
p
J+j
,aj+1}
{
ξku
(
ckj , l
k
j
)
+ ξpu
(
cpJ+jl
p
J+j
)
+ βEVj+1 (aj+1,Φj+1)
}
(4)
subject to (3) . The expected value function EVj+1 is defined as
EVj+1 (aj+1,Φj+1) =

3∑
g=1
Ω(gj, gj+1)Vj+1 (aj+1,Φj+1) for j = 1, .., J − 1,
∑
sek
′∈{F,I}
Π
(
sep
′
, sek′
) 3∑
g=1
Ω(gJ , g1) θmV1 (a1,Φ1) for j = J.
Households face shocks to their demographic structure each period as expressed by the Markov
switching matrix Ω(gj , gj+1). Every J period when the new household is formed a shock to the
occupational composition is realized via Markov switching matrix Π
(
sep
′
, sek′
)
. This shock
only affects the newborn generation and determines the type of household that this generation
will form with their parents. The current household saving in the last period is the intended
bequest, which is divided equally among m children and becomes the initial asset of the next
households in the family line a′1 =
aJ+1
m
.
2.3 Firm Problem
Firms in both sectors choose to rent physical capital and human capital to maximize profits.
Thus, the firm’s problem is
max
(Hset ,K
se
t )
{
Ase (Kse)α
se
(Hse)1−α
se
−wseHse − qseKse
}
,
given factor prices wse and qse, where se = {I, F} .
2.4 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
Definition 1 Given realizations of initial assets, occupational composition
{
sep, sek
}
, exogen-
ous sector transition probabilities Π, survival probabilities, and government policies
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{
τC , τ
I
L, τ
F
L , τ ss, τK ,∆G,Ψ
I ,ΨF
}
, a stationary recursive competitive equilibrium is a collec-
tion of value functions {Vj (aj,Φj)}
J
j=1 with Φj =
{
sep, sek, ξp, ξk
}
, household decision rules{
cpJ+j , l
p
J+j , c
k
j , l
k
j , aj+1
}J
j=1
, a collection of sequences of time invariant distributions
{
µj (aj,Φj)
}J
j=1
,
sequences of aggregate stocks of physical capital and human capital {Kse,Hse} , and sequences
of prices {wse, qse, R} with se = {F, I} such that
(i) household decision rules
{
cpJ+j , l
p
J+j , c
k
j , l
k
j , aj+1
}J
j=1
solve the household maximization prob-
lem (4),
(ii) firms solve the profit maximization problem so that factor prices are determined by
wF =
(
1− αF
)
AF
(
KF
HF
)αF
,
wI =
(
1− αI
)
AI
(
KI
HI
)αI
,
qF = αFAF
(
KF
HF
)αF−1
,
qI = αIAI
(
KI
HI
)αI−1
,
and the after-tax interest rate is determined by
R = (1− τK) q
F + 1− δF = (1− τK) q
I + 1− δI ,
(iii) aggregate stocks are given by
S =
∑
j,sep,sek,ξp,ξk
∫
a
µj (aj,Φj) aj (aj,Φj) ,
C =
∑
j,sep,sek,ξp,ξk
∫
a
µj (aj,Φj) cj (aj,Φj) ,
HI =
∑
j,sep,sek,ξp,ξk
∫
a
µj (aj,Φj) (1− lj)e
I
j ,
HF =
∑
j,sep,sek,ξp,ξk
∫
a
µj (aj,Φj) (1− lj)e
F
j ,
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(iv) commodity markets clear
C + S +∆G
∑
se∈{I,F}
Y se =
∑
se∈{I,F}
Y se +
∑
se∈{I,F}
(1− δse)Kse,
(v) the government budget constraint holds
debt payment︷︸︸︷
RB +
consumption︷ ︸︸ ︷
∆GY +
pension payment︷ ︸︸ ︷
J∑
j=Jw+1
∑
sep=F,ξp,ξk
∫
a
µj (aj,Φj)Pen+
transfer payment︷ ︸︸ ︷
J∑
j=Jw+1
∑
sep=I,ξp,ξk
∫
a
µj (aj,Φj)T
=
labor income tax revenue︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
j,ξp,ξk
∑
se={I,F}
∫
a
µij (aj,Φj)w
se (1− lj) e
se
j τ
se
L +
social security tax revenue︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
j,a,ξp,ξk
∫
a
µij (aj,Φj)w
F (1− lj) e
F
j τSS +
capital income tax revenue︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
j,sep,sek,ξp,ξk
∫
a
µj (aj ,Φj) aj (aj ,Φj) τK +
consumption tax revenue︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
j,sep,sek,ξp,ξk
∫
a
µj (aj,Φj) cj (aj,Φj) τC +
accidental bequest revenue︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
j,sep,sek,ξp=ξk=0
∫
a
[
1− µj (aj ,Φj)
]
aj (aj,Φj) +
borrowing︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1 + n) (1 + g)B,
(vi) and the time invariant distribution satisfies
µ1 (a1,Φ1) =
∑
sep′=k={I,F}
∑
ξp
′
,ξk
′
∫
a
Π
(
sep
′
, sek
′
)
Ω(g1, gJ)µJ (aJ ,ΦJ) ,
µj+1 (aj+1,Φj+1) =
∑
ξp,ξk
∫
a
Ω(gj, gj+1)µj (aj ,Φj) , for j = 1, ..., J − 1.
3 Calibration
We use parameters reported in table 1 to calibrate the benchmark steady state economy to
match data from Brazil in the late 1990s. We choose Brazil for two reasons. First, Brazil
has been implementing a social assistance program for years and second, Brazil is a middle
income developing country with reasonably good availability of data. Model outcomes and data
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comparisons are reported in table 2. In the following we will discuss the parameter selection.
Solutions to the model as well as algorithms are presented in a Technical Appendix.10
3.1 Technology
In standard one sector models the income share of capital α is in the range of 0.3 to 0.36.
Estimates of α for developing countries tend to be higher. Ferreira and do Nascimento (2005)
use α = 0.4 to match the Brazilian economy. We are not aware of estimates relating the capital
shares of formal and informal sectors separately. However, the informal sector is documented
as a labor-intensive sector so the income share of capital is likely to be smaller than in the
formal sector. We therefore calibrate the income shares of capital in the informal and formal
sectors with αI = 0.25 and αF = 0.4 in the benchmark economy. We then conduct sensitivity
analysis on the capital income share of the informal sector. The depreciation rate is assumed
to be 5% annually for both sectors.
To the best of our knowledge there is no estimate comparing the levels of total factor
productivity (TFP) in the informal sector to TFP in the formal sector. However, we feel
comfortable applying the restriction AI < AF , so that the formal sector is more efficient. We
then normalize AF to 1 and pick AI to restrict the share of informal sector output in GDP to
be around 25%, which is close to the estimated range for Brazil in Friedman et al. (2000) who
report a lower bound of 29%.
The annual growth rate in Brazil was around 8.6% in the 1970s, dropped down to around
1.6% in the 1980s, and then went up again to 2.65% in the 1990s.11 In the model, we therefore
choose a real annual rate of growth g = 2.65%.
3.2 The Size of the Informal Labor Market and Sector Mobility
The size of the informal sector in terms of employment and relative size of GDP varies across
countries. The size of formal sector employment coincide with the fraction of social security
10The Technical Appendix is available on the authors’ website at:
http://mypage.iu.edu/~chtran/Research/sscApp.pdf
11See the report on GDP, growth and employment at http://www.brazil.org.uk/economy/gdp.html
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coverage in our model. According to Giambiagi and Mello (2006) the coverage of social security
in Brazil is around 50% in 2005.
It is evident that parents’ skills and occupation as well as parental networks will play an
important role in determining their children’ probabilities to find work in the formal sector.
These private networks are especially important in the context of developing countries and are
a source of inter-generational dependence. Children of formal sector employees have typically
better education than children of informal sector workers. Compare Marcouiller, de Castilla
and Woodruff (1997) for evidence on respective higher education levels of formal sector workers
in developing countries. Better education and existing private networks will make it easier to
secure work in the formal sector. In other words, the probability to transition from the formal
to the informal sector is smaller for children of formal sector parents. In our calibration, we use
Markov transition probabilities of piI,I = 0.8 and piF,F = 0.8, which reflect the sector persistence
and result in 50% of the labor force working in the informal sector.
3.3 Demographics
We assume that individuals are born at age 20 and become immediately economically active.
Since survival rates are relatively small after the age of 90, we assume that individuals die
at age 90. To reduce the computational burden, we pick the model period to be 5 years.
This restriction implies that individual lifetime is 14 periods, composed of 9 working periods
(equivalent to 45 years) and 5 retirement periods (equivalent to 25 years). In other words,
agents retire at age 65, which is close to Brazil’s average retirement age of 63 reported in
Queiroz (2005). In the model we completely abstract from the link between public pensions
and early retirement in Brazil.12
Survival probabilities are taken from the life tables of World Health Organization member
countries.13 We adjust annual rates to 5 year period rates in our model. We do not have
separate survival probabilities for formal and informal sector workers in Brazil. As documented
12Generous pensions and early retirement are highly correlated in Brazil, especially in the public sector. See
Glomm, Jung and Tran (2006) for more details on this issue.
13Visit http://www.who.int/whosis/database/life/life_tables/life_tables_process.cfm?country=bra&language=en
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in the literature, the poor (informal sector workers) have lower survival probabilities than the
rich (formal sector workers). We therefore adjust the life-table survival probabilities in the
following way. We lower the survival probabilities of informal sector workers by 2% and we
increase the survival probabilities of formal sector workers by 0.5%.
In the model, we assume that population grows at a constant rate so that there is a station-
ary demographic structure. Population growth has slowed during the last 20 years in Brazil.
According to Ferreira (2005) the average annual population growth rate over the last 20 years
from 1980 to 2000 is 1.79%. We therefore pick a growth rate n = 0.018 resulting in m = 1.5631
children per individual in the model.
3.4 Preference and Altruism
In our model, we use additive preferences in consumption and leisure
u (c, l) =
c1−σ
1− σ
+ κ
l1−ψ
1− ψ
,
where we restrict the utility of consumption to be of log form (σ = 1) in order to fulfil the
condition for balanced growth as suggested in King, Plosser and Rebelo (2001). Estimates of
the parameter of intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ for Brazil vary from 1 to 5 (see Issler
and Piqueira (2000) and Soriano and Nakane (2003)). Fuster, Imrohoroglu and Imrohoroglu
(2007) use σ = 4 in a similar model with altruism. We do not know any estimate for the
parameter governing the intertemporal elasticity of leisure ψ in Brazil. Following previous
studies, we choose ψ = 1.
In the similar model for the U.S. economy Fuster, Imrohoroglu and Imrohoroglu (2007) use
elastic labor supply for workers and force the elderly to be fully retired. In this paper, since
we want to concentrate on the labor supply of elderly people, we assume that young agents
supply labor inelastically. This restriction implies that the weight of leisure of young household
members is κ = 0. We calibrate the labor supply of young agents to match average weekly
working hours. We calibrate parameter κ for parents to match average labor supply at higher
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ages.
Discount factor β and altruism factor θ are free parameters. One may calibrate either β
or θ, or both to match the capital-output ratio. Fuster, Imrohoroglu and Imrohoroglu (2003)
choose θ = 1 and calibrate β = 0.97 (annual discount factor) to match the capital-output
ratio. Nishiyama (2002) calibrates both β and θ. We set θ = 1 and adjust β to match the
capital-output ratio.
3.5 Life-Time Efficiency Unit and Labor Earning Profile
Turra and Queiroz (2005) report labor incomes of household heads by age and level of education
in Brazil. Ferreira, Lanjouw and Neri (2003) report the distribution of the labor force by
educational levels. We combine their estimates to construct labor income profiles for informal
and formal sector workers and the average labor income ratio between informal and formal
sector workers. We assume that less educated people tend to work in the informal sector as
reported in Telles (1992).
We calibrate the labor efficiency profile so that we match the labor earnings profiles as
well as the average income ratio between informal and formal sector workers in Brazil. In our
model the average labor income ratio between informal and formal sector workers is around
60%, which is in the range reported in Gindling and Terrell (2004) and Marcouiller, de Castilla
and Woodruff (1997). We graph the income-age profiles of informal and formal sector workers
in figure 1.14
3.6 Government
In Brazil, total tax revenue is about 30% of GDP in 1998, with social security tax revenue
contributing almost 5% (see Ferreira (2005)). We calibrate tax rates to match this size of
government.
In the model, the government taxes labor income of both informal and formal sector workers.
The labor tax in the formal sector is τFL = 20%. We assume that the labor income tax rate in
14The Technical Appendix contains the efficiency profiles that were used as a basis for the income profiles. The
Technical Appendix is available on the authors’ website at: http://mypage.iu.edu/~chtran/Research/sscApp.pdf
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the informal sector τ IL is rather small at 3%, which reflects financial contributions of informal
sector workers to the government budget. According to Palacious and Pallares-Mirallets (2000),
effective pension taxes are between 7% to 12% of total labor cost in developing countries. In
our calibration, the social security tax applies to labor income of formal sector employees and
is set to 10%, which results in a 4.5% share of social security tax revenue in terms of GDP. The
capital income tax rate is chosen at 20%. The proportional consumption tax rate is around
15% which is close to the one reported in Ferreira (2005). In the model, either consumption
tax , formal sector labor income tax, or capital income tax adjust to balance the government
budget every period.
In the benchmark economy there is no social assistance available to the elderly in the
informal sector so that ΨI = 0. The government only has a social security program for retirees
in the formal sector. The social security trust fund is not independent from the government
budget. As reported in Palacious and Pallares-Mirallets (2000), the average pension as a share
of average wage ranges from 35% to 60%. Since Brazil has a very generous pension program,
we choose the replacement rate for pension payments ΨF to match social security payments as
a fraction of GDP. Our hypothetical replacement rate ΨF = 60% of the average labor income
of pre-retirement employment results in the social security program to be around 4.5% of GDP.
It is smaller than 5.06% of GDP reported in Ferreira (2005) because this number includes the
social assistance program.
We assume that government borrows a fix fraction of GDP each period. We calibrate the
ratio of government debt to GDP to be 35% which is close to the average in the data between
1995 and 2000. Residual government consumption is 25% of GDP and matches the size of the
government budget in the data. Government consumption plays no further role in the model.
4 Policy Experiments and Results
We start the benchmark economy without a social assistance program for informal sector
workers. We then assume that the government starts a social assistance program that is
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available to all informal sector workers who are 65 and older. The generosity of the social
assistance program is reflected in the magnitude of the replacement rate ΨI . In the benchmark
economy the replacement rate equals zero, ΨI = 0. In our policy experiments we vary the
generosity of the social assistance program and assume that the government can use either
consumption tax, labor tax, or capital income tax to finance the program. We then report
changes in key aggregate variables, family transfers, and welfare in tables 3, 4 and 5.15
Capital accumulation. The distortions on savings from introducing the social pension
program are reported in the third column of table 3. The extension of social security discourages
people to save for two reasons. First, the social assistance program redistributes from the young
(high propensity to save) to the poor elderly (low propensity to save). Second, taxes used to
finance the program distort the savings behavior. This is especially true for capital taxes.
The crowding-out effects vary substantially between different financing instruments. Crowding
out effects are the largest when capital income tax is used to finance the extension and the
smallest when consumption tax adjusts. When increasing the replacement rate from 0 to 0.5,
capital stock drops by 1%, 2.7%, and 8% under consumption tax, labor income tax, and capital
income tax financing schemes, respectively.
The crowding-out effect is relatively small in comparison to previous results in the literature
on social security reform due to two reasons. First, the social assistance program is targeted to
a subpart of the population so that its size is kept relatively small. This leads to smaller dis-
tortions in the economy. Second, as established in Fuster (1999), the bequest motive dampens
the decrease in savings due to life cycle patterns.
Labor supply. The labor supply adjustments are reported in columns 4, 5 and 6 of table
3. The social assistance program generates different effects on average labor supply depending
on skills and working sector. The average labor supply of informal sector workers drops by
more than 3% when increasing the replacement rate to 0.5. The intuition is straightforward.
Without social assistance the elderly in the informal sector have to work longer (extensive
15Note that we normalize the results of the benchmark economy to 100 which allows for easy comparison with
the results of alternative policies.
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margin) and harder (intensive margin) to support their consumption. After the reform they
have additional income from government transfers to finance their consumption and therefore
supply less labor. The top panel of figure 2 reports changes in the labor force participation rate
of informal sector workers. We see that after the introduction of the social assistance program
the participation rate of informal sector workers drops significantly. Before the social assistance
program some informal sector workers stay in the labor force until age 90. The social assistance
program ensures that no workers works beyond age 80. The bottom panel in figure 2 shows the
change in labor supply of informal sector workers.
The average labor supply of formal sector workers also decreases slightly when the replace-
ment rate is 0.5 and either consumption tax or labor tax adjusts. Surprisingly, the labor supply
of formal sector workers increases slightly when capital tax is used as a financing instrument
and the social assistance program is relatively large (ΨI > 0.7). As the crowding-out effects are
more pronounced under this financing scheme, formal sector workers decide to work longer to
compensate for the income loss. Note that formal sector workers finance the extension without
getting much direct benefit from it.
Overall, the aggregate labor supply declines by almost 2% when introducing a social assist-
ance program with a 0.5 replacement rate.
Output. The cost of introducing the social assistance program in terms of lost output
is non-trivial. For a 0.5 replacement rate the social assistance program reduces steady state
output between 0.6% and 3.25% depending on whether consumption tax or capital tax is used
to finance the expansion. This result is a direct consequence of the crowing-out effects, which
lower the stocks of physical capital and human capital.
Bequests. We report the effect of public transfers on bequests by household types in
table 4. We observe both crowding-out and crowding-in effects on intended bequests across
household types. The effects also are non-monotone within certain types of households.
For households G1 : I, I — whose parents and children are informal sector workers — be-
quests increase by 12% when the replacement rate is 0.5 and consumption tax is the financing
instrument. The introduction of a social assistance program has a direct effect on the income
23
of old parents. Holding other thing constants, the income of old parents increase and so does
the overall income of the household. As a consequence, parents want to leave more bequests
to their children (positive effect). On the other hand, the introduction of a social assistance
program raises the future income of children because current “informal sector” children will
become recipients of a social pension when they are old. This results in a disincentive for
leaving bequests (negative effect), since the current parents’ account for these future gains of
their children when optimizing the bequest decision. Whenever the positive effect is dominant,
current households will increase their bequests as can be seen in column 2 of table 4.
For households G1 : I, F — whose parents are in the informal sector but whose children are
in the formal sector — bequests increase. That is, the current household with older members
(parent) receiving social assistance wants to increase bequests to offset the negative effect on
younger members (children) who will not receive social assistance but have to pay a higher price
for consumption in the future (positive effect). On the other hand, since social assistance crowds
out the labor supply of old parents, their labor earnings decline. Moreover, efficiency loss due
to declines in aggregate capital stock and labor supply lower individual income. which results
in a decrease in bequests (negative effect). Our results show that bequests are consistently
larger under all tax regimes. This implies that the positive effects dominate.
For households G1 : F, I — whose parent is in the formal sector but whose children are in
the informal sector — bequests decrease for all three tax regimes. The current “formal sector”
parents, who are suffering from the social assistance program, cut bequests to their “informal
sector” children, who will benefit from the program.
For households G1 : F,F bequests change by a small amount (1%) when consumption tax
is the financing instrument. However, when labor and capital income taxes are used to finance
the expansion, bequests start dropping as the social assistance program becomes more generous
(up to 5% for ΨI = 0.5).
At the aggregate level, bequests increase when the government finances the social assistance
program with consumption tax or labor tax (crowding in effect). On the other hand bequests
decrease when capital taxes finance the expansion. In other words, in this case public transfers
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crowd out aggregate bequests.
Within family transfers. Family transfers have a credit and an insurance function. The
former lessens the borrowing constraint so that individuals are able to consume more when
young. The later insures the consumption of parents and children against income shocks. As
reported in the top panels of figure 3, households whose parents work in the informal sector
G1 : I, I and G1 : I, F transfer money from children to parents. From the bottom panels we see
that children in households where parents are formal sector workers (G1 : F, I and G1 : F,F ),
borrow from their parents early in their careers because their income is low. They later transfer
income back to their parents when the parents have become old.
The effects of the public insurance program (when capital taxes adjust) on intervivos trans-
fers from parents to their children differ across household types. Household types G1 : I, F and
G1 : F, I tend to increase transfers from children to parents, whereas household type G1 : I, I
increases transfers to parents around age 70 and decrease transfers when parents are older than
75. This indicates that intervivos (private) transfers are only partially crowded out by public
transfers.
Wealth Inequality. Perhaps surprisingly, the wealth inequality increases. The Gini coef-
ficient becomes larger after increasing the replacement rate. The changes in the Gini coefficient
are monotone over the range of the policy parameter. We identify two possible reasons. First,
altruistic agents change the amount of bequests to compensate their parents or children who
suffer from the new policy. Young formal sector workers who will not be recipients of social
assistance receive more bequests from their parents as protection against high taxes in the
future. Young informal sector workers who will receive social assistance tend to receive less
bequests from their parent. Second, the effect of a social assistance program on labor supply
are not identical across agents. The labor supply of informal sector workers drops much more
than that of formal sector workers. Therefore, labor income of informal sector workers is much
lower than that of formal sector workers. This also leads to higher concentration of wealth.
Welfare. We report welfare effects across household groups and types in table 5. Welfare is
measured in terms of indirect utility of newly established households. We identify the following
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important sources of welfare effects: (i) crowding-out effect due to distortions on savings and
labor supply; (ii) redistribution effect resulting from the targeting of the social assistance
program and its financing instruments; (iii) risk-sharing effect due to risk aversion and the
resulting insurance function of the social assistance program. The welfare effects vary across
household types and change significantly with increasing generosity of the social assistance
program. Depending on the demographic structure and the working sector/skill composition,
a household can experience welfare gains or losses.
The welfare on the parent-child households G1 : I, I — who are recipients of social pensions
— increases by 2.5% following an increase in the replacement rate from ΨI = 0 to ΨI = 0.5
(consumption tax case). The welfare gains are even more pronounced under labor income tax
and capital income tax financing. The welfare effects are monotone over the range of policy
parameter ΨI .
The welfare effects on the parent-child household G1 : I, F — whose parents are recip-
ients of social assistance — are not monotone due to two competing forces. On one hand,
cash transfers to parents in the informal sector increase household consumption and leisure
(positive effect). On the other hand, higher taxes and distortionary effects on savings and
labor supply lower household income, especially the income of children working in the formal
sector (negative effect). Consequently, the dominant effect will determine the direction of the
welfare change. For small transfer programs the negative effect dominates, so that welfare
drops. As the social assistance program grows in size, welfare increases approximately to its
original level.
The welfare effect on household types G1 : F, I — whose formal sector parents do not
receive a social pension but whose informal sector children will when they are old enough —
is negative. Intergenerational links through operative bequests spread the income effects over
the generations in the dynasty, which in turn affects welfare. An additional increase in transfer
income of the future household results in a positive effect on the current household’s welfare.
However, the current household suffers from paying a higher tax. The welfare loss indicates
that the negative effects are dominant.
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For households G2 : I — parents with no children work in the informal sector— the welfare
effect is remarkably strong. They will have no family support nor will they receive public
pension payments when old. They therefore rely on their own savings to support consumption
when old. There is no other instrument to insure themselves against longevity risk. The
introduction of a social assistance program, therefore, gives them a great opportunity to smooth
their consumption.
Household type G3 : I — children in the informal sector without parents— experience welfare
losses when consumption tax and capital tax are financing the expansion of the social assistance
program. In the labor tax regime this type experiences a welfare gain, due to the fact that this
type does not pay the increased labor tax.
For all other household types, G2 : F andG3 : F we report welfare losses. This is mainly due
to the distortion of the social assistance program which in the end lowers household incomes.
The introduction of a social assistance program does not result in any additional benefit to
these agents. On other hand, the program creates distortions such as lower wage rates, higher
taxes, and higher consumption prices which then lower income and welfare. For instance,
households G2 : F− parents in the formal sector without children− will not receive benefits
from the public pension program but have to live in a less efficient economy with higher tax
rates.
5 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we conduct sensitivity analysis on parameters σ and κ in the utility function.16
First, we shut down labor/leisure choice of the elderly by setting κ = 0 and keeping the
parameter of risk aversion unchanged at σ = 1. In our policy experiments, welfare gains
are still obtained for household types G1 : I, I and G2 : I. Type G1 : I, F still exhibits a
non-monotonic pattern but the positive welfare effect starts already at low replacement rates.
Second, since the magnitude of the risk-sharing effect is sensitive to the parameter of risk-
16The tables for these experiments are available in the Technical Appendix on the authors’ website at:
http://mypage.iu.edu/~chtran/Research/sscApp.pdf
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aversion, we consider two cases with more risk averse agents. That is, we set κ = 0 but increase
the level of risk aversion to σ = 2 and 4. In our policy experiments, welfare gains for all of
these recipient households are magnified because the insurance function of the social assistance
program becomes more important with increasing risk aversion.
Third, since the welfare effect varies with the preference for leisure of the elderly, we consider
an economy in which the elderly value leisure more than in the benchmark economy, that is
κ = 2. In this scenario, our results on the welfare effects become even more pronounced.
Fourth, we are interested in analyzing these effects in an economy with more income in-
equality. We calibrate efficiency profiles for formal and informal sector workers in such way that
results a smaller ratio of average lifetime income between informal and formal sector workers
becomes smaller (28%). The positive welfare effect for group G1 : I, F— parents in the informal
sector, children in the formal sector— becomes more pronounced. Therefore, group G1 : I, F
experiences a welfare gain. In this case the insurance function and the redistribution function
of the social assistance program dominate the negative effects from the distortions. This is true
for all tax regimes. This also implies that for developing countries with a large income gap
between formal and informal sector workers we are more likely to observe a positive welfare
effect from a social assistance program.
Fifth, we are also concerned that the size of the informal sector or the coverage rate of
social security may be important for the magnitude of the distortion effects caused by the
social assistance program. To verify whether our results would be different in an economy with
either a smaller or a larger informal sector, we calibrate the model to an economy with coverage
rates of social security of 25% and 75%, respectively. Our results indicate that even though the
magnitudes of the policy effects on aggregate variables are changing, the general result of the
policy experiment does not change.
Finally, we conduct our analysis in an economy with a capital income share of the informal
sector αI = 0.2 and αI = 0.3. We also run a smaller social assistance program targeting only
to households where both, parents and children are informal sector workers. In all of these
experiments our main result, that group G1 : I, I, G1 : I, F, and G2 : I experience welfare
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gains, holds.
Hence, in contrast to the literature focusing on developed countries (e.g. Fuster, Imroho-
roglu and Imrohoroglu (2003) and Fuster, Imrohoroglu and Imrohoroglu (2007)) our welfare
effects are more persistent. First, since social assistance programs target only a small part of the
population, the crowding-out effects are relatively small. Second, skill shocks in combination
with the segmentation of the production sectors and labor markets, increase the importance of
the insurance function of social assistance programs. Third, social assistance programs have a
redistribution function because they target the uncovered elderly in the informal sector. Fourth,
decreasing in labor supply of very old informal sector workers (> 75) results in welfare gain.
6 Conclusion
We examine the effects of extending social security on private transfers, savings, labor supply
of elderly workers, the wealth distribution, and welfare. Our analysis emphasizes the context
of developing countries and is different from previous literature in several dimensions. First,
we model the segmentation of labor markets and production sectors in a two-sector model.
Second, we explicitly model a “dual” social security system, a formal one operated by the gov-
ernment and covering only a part of the population and an informal one operated by households
themselves via altruistic motives. Third, we model the environment in which there is a lack
of insurance instruments against demographic and lifetime income shocks. Individual agents
have uneven access to insurance services against those shocks. Informal sector workers rely
exclusively on family insurance and face a severe shortage of insurance services when old.
Similar to results in previous literature, our model predicts the crowding-out effects of social
security. Introducing a moderately-sized social assistance program lowers output by up to 3.25%
and labor supply by up to 2.5%. The magnitude of the effects depends on how the expansion is
financed. In contrast to previous literature on social security reform in developed countries, the
model predicts that the introduction of a public social assistance program has positive effects
on the welfare of recipients. This result suggests that the “positive” insurance function and the
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redistribution function of the social assistance program dominate the “negative” crowding-out
effects. In addition, the labor force participation rate of very old informal sector workers (> 75)
can be reduced to zero. Our results show that accounting for the characteristics of developing
countries is essential when studying social security reform in developing countries.
Our results carry policy implications. First, our findings provide a justification for extending
the coverage of social security. Second, our results quantify the efficiency loss of a social
assistance program. Third, the results indicate that consumption taxes minimize the efficiency
loss. Finally, our results show that introducing a social assistance program will not lead to
more equality in the long run.
Our analysis is limited in several dimensions. First, we have not yet solved for transitions.
We are therefore not able to make a statement about the short-run implications. Second,
the occupational/sector choice is not endogenized. In addition, there are several interesting
questions which can be studied within this framework, for example, the relationship between
fiscal policy and the size of the informal sector, allocation of skills across sectors, trade-offs
between a social assistance program and other public programs such as education and health,
the effects on private investment in education and human capital accumulation, and the effects
of population aging in developing countries. We leave these issues for future research.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Tables and Graphs
Parameters Model Observation/Comment/Source
Preferences
Discount factor β = .97 to match K
Y
and R
Inverse of inter-temporal
elasticity of substitution
(IIES) for consumption
σ = 1
IIES for leisure ψ = 1
Consumption share
in preferences
κ = 1 match labor supply
Altruism parameter θ = 1 sensitivity analysis
Technology
Annual growth rate g = 2.65%
TFP
AI= 1,
AF= 1.4,
to match Y
I
Y F
Share of capital income
αI= 0.25,
αF= 0.40,
Ferreira and do Nascimento (2005)
report 0.4 for Brazil
Annual depreciation rate
δI= 4%,
δF= 4%,
to match K
Y
and R
Demography
Maximum lifetime 2J = 14 equivalent to 70 years
Max working periods Jw= 9 equivalent to 45 year
Max retirement periods Jr= 5 equivalent to 25 year
Max household lifetime J = 7
Annual population growth n = 1.8% Ferreira (2005)
Sector Sector Transitions
piI,I= 0.8
piF,F= 0.8
to match 50% of employment
in the informal labor market
Government
Labor income taxes τ IL= 3%; τ
F
L= 2%
Capital tax τK= 22.38%
Social security tax τSS= 10%
Consumption tax τC= 15%
Replacement rates ΨI = 0, ΨF = 0.6
Government borrowing as
fraction of GDP
∆B= 0.05 to match debt-output ratio
Government consumption ∆G= 0.25 to match government size
Table 1: Preference and Policy Parameters
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Variables: ΨI = 0 Model Data Observation/Comment/Source
K
Y
Capital output ratio 2.5 2.5
Bresser-Pereira (1990) and
Souza-Sobrinho (2004)
R Interest rate 6.6% 10% Garcia (2003)
Y I
Y
Informal sector size
(in % of GDP)
24.2% 29% Friedman et al. (2000)
Informal sector size
(in % of employment)
50% 50% Giambiagi and Mello (2006)
wIHI
wFHF
Average income ratio
informal to formal sector
60% 30− 80%
Gindling and Terrell (2004) and
Marcouiller, de Castilla and Woodruff (1997)
Debt
Y
Debt-Output ratio 36.1% 35% Ferreira (2005)
Tax revenue 29.4% 30.6% Ferreira (2005)
Consumption tax revenue
(in % of GDP)
7.2% 9.31% Ferreira (2005)
Social security tax revenue
(in % of GDP)
4.5% 5.06% Ferreira (2005)
Table 2: Model Outcomes that Match Data
37
ΨI Y K N NI NF Gini r% Tax τ%
0.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 0.52 6.56 15.00
0.10 99.79 99.59 99.38 98.82 99.94 0.53 6.57 15.71
0.20 99.65 99.36 99.05 98.20 99.91 0.54 6.58 16.41
0.30 99.55 99.21 98.74 97.63 99.89 0.54 6.59 17.11
0.40 99.47 99.11 98.49 97.15 99.87 0.54 6.59 17.80
τC 0.50 99.40 99.03 98.25 96.71 99.85 0.55 6.60 18.50
0.60 99.35 98.99 98.08 96.39 99.83 0.55 6.60 19.18
0.70 99.30 98.96 97.93 96.11 99.81 0.55 6.60 19.87
0.80 99.30 98.99 97.84 95.93 99.80 0.55 6.59 20.56
0.90 99.31 99.06 97.77 95.81 99.79 0.55 6.59 21.25
1.00 99.34 99.18 97.73 95.73 99.79 0.55 6.58 21.93
0.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 0.53 6.58 19.96
0.10 99.61 99.28 99.21 98.66 99.77 0.54 6.61 20.69
0.20 99.26 98.67 98.74 97.95 99.55 0.54 6.63 21.42
0.30 98.96 98.15 98.30 97.28 99.35 0.54 6.65 22.14
0.40 98.68 97.70 97.90 96.69 99.15 0.54 6.67 22.86
τFL 0.50 98.43 97.29 97.52 96.13 98.95 0.54 6.69 23.57
0.60 98.19 96.94 97.20 95.70 98.75 0.55 6.70 24.27
0.70 97.98 96.62 96.92 95.32 98.56 0.55 6.71 24.97
0.80 97.80 96.37 96.68 95.01 98.40 0.54 6.72 25.68
0.90 97.66 96.18 96.48 94.77 98.25 0.54 6.72 26.37
1.00 97.53 96.02 96.30 94.56 98.09 0.54 6.73 27.07
0.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 0.53 6.56 22.38
0.10 99.25 98.10 99.41 98.87 99.97 0.54 6.56 23.23
0.20 98.59 96.42 99.12 98.30 99.96 0.54 6.56 24.07
0.30 97.97 94.84 98.85 97.77 99.96 0.55 6.55 24.91
0.40 97.35 93.30 98.63 97.33 99.96 0.55 6.54 25.75
τK 0.50 96.75 91.78 98.43 96.92 99.97 0.55 6.53 26.58
0.60 96.15 90.27 98.28 96.64 99.98 0.56 6.52 27.42
0.70 95.55 88.79 98.17 96.40 100.00 0.56 6.50 28.26
0.80 94.99 87.37 98.12 96.27 100.02 0.56 6.49 29.10
0.90 94.43 85.97 98.10 96.21 100.05 0.56 6.47 29.95
1.00 93.89 84.60 98.11 96.20 100.08 0.56 6.45 30.81
Table 3: Aggregate Effects with wIHI/wFHF = 0.6 and κ = 1
38
ΨI G1:I,I G1:I,F G1:F,I G1:F,F Average
0.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
0.10 100.60 103.14 99.80 100.55 100.80
0.20 102.50 105.52 99.10 100.83 101.31
0.30 105.19 108.45 98.16 100.99 101.87
0.40 108.36 111.66 97.12 101.07 102.44
τC 0.50 111.77 115.05 96.03 101.11 103.02
0.60 115.29 118.82 94.89 101.11 103.65
0.70 118.87 122.69 93.73 101.09 104.29
0.80 122.48 126.52 92.39 100.98 104.83
0.90 126.12 130.36 90.97 100.82 105.34
1.00 130.28 134.14 89.43 100.60 105.82
0.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
0.10 101.30 102.63 99.69 99.88 100.42
0.20 103.49 103.67 99.21 99.61 100.54
0.30 106.42 105.45 98.44 99.18 100.71
0.40 109.85 107.90 97.54 98.66 100.95
τFL 0.50 113.51 110.69 96.58 98.08 101.23
0.60 117.27 113.60 95.51 97.78 101.54
0.70 121.16 116.57 94.34 97.09 101.77
0.80 126.55 119.50 93.01 96.34 102.01
0.90 131.24 122.34 91.46 95.50 102.11
1.00 136.09 125.78 89.88 94.63 102.29
0.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
0.10 99.93 101.85 98.11 99.41 99.59
0.20 101.27 103.34 95.65 98.52 98.96
0.30 103.42 105.04 92.94 97.47 98.31
0.40 106.04 106.70 90.19 96.34 97.64
τK 0.50 108.87 108.33 87.46 95.18 96.97
0.60 111.74 110.01 84.80 94.00 96.31
0.70 114.61 112.03 82.16 92.78 95.66
0.80 117.47 114.18 79.41 91.44 94.94
0.90 120.31 116.30 76.79 90.04 94.22
1.00 123.16 118.34 74.34 88.57 93.47
Table 4: Bequests to Next Households with wIHI/wFHF = 0.6 and κ = 1
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ΨI G1:I,I G1:I,F G1:F,I G1:F,F G2:I G2:F G3:I G3:F Average
0.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
0.10 100.29 99.68 99.76 99.72 109.41 99.89 99.64 99.74 99.89
0.20 100.72 99.76 99.48 99.44 118.47 99.69 99.31 99.48 99.85
0.30 101.36 99.88 99.21 99.16 127.15 99.49 99.01 99.22 99.88
0.40 101.96 100.00 98.93 98.88 135.42 99.27 98.72 98.97 99.90
τC 0.50 102.54 100.11 98.65 98.60 143.26 99.05 98.43 98.73 99.91
0.60 103.08 100.22 98.38 98.33 150.63 98.83 98.15 98.48 99.92
0.70 103.59 100.32 98.10 98.06 157.59 98.62 97.87 98.24 99.91
0.80 104.07 100.41 97.82 97.79 164.15 98.38 97.58 97.99 99.90
0.90 104.52 100.49 97.53 97.52 170.35 98.13 97.29 97.74 99.87
1.00 104.98 100.59 97.25 97.25 176.34 97.87 97.03 97.51 99.85
0.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
0.10 100.61 99.54 99.93 99.58 110.62 99.95 99.99 99.60 99.92
0.20 101.51 99.54 99.84 99.14 120.82 99.84 100.01 99.19 99.95
0.30 102.59 99.55 99.73 98.71 130.58 99.70 100.05 98.79 100.04
0.40 103.64 99.56 99.62 98.28 139.88 99.55 100.10 98.39 100.12
τFL 0.50 104.64 99.58 99.51 97.84 148.67 99.40 100.16 97.99 100.18
0.60 105.60 99.59 99.41 97.42 156.93 99.27 100.21 97.59 100.24
0.70 106.53 99.60 99.29 96.98 164.74 99.10 100.26 97.19 100.28
0.80 107.47 99.63 99.16 96.54 172.33 98.91 100.34 96.78 100.32
0.90 108.37 99.64 99.01 96.09 179.49 98.69 100.40 96.37 100.35
1.00 109.25 99.66 98.87 95.64 186.31 98.48 100.46 95.95 100.37
0.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
0.10 100.41 99.66 99.76 99.66 109.13 99.73 99.72 99.68 99.89
0.20 100.95 99.68 99.48 99.30 118.01 99.37 99.47 99.35 99.84
0.30 101.70 99.76 99.19 98.94 126.56 98.99 99.23 99.02 99.86
0.40 102.41 99.83 98.88 98.57 134.77 98.58 99.00 98.69 99.86
τK 0.50 103.09 99.89 98.57 98.19 142.60 98.16 98.77 98.35 99.84
0.60 103.73 99.94 98.25 97.81 150.02 97.72 98.54 98.00 99.80
0.70 104.33 99.97 97.92 97.42 157.05 97.27 98.30 97.65 99.75
0.80 104.90 99.99 97.57 97.01 163.70 96.77 98.05 97.28 99.68
0.90 105.44 100.00 97.21 96.59 170.03 96.24 97.80 96.91 99.59
1.00 105.94 100.00 96.84 96.17 176.00 95.70 97.54 96.53 99.48
Table 5: Welfare of Household Age 1 with wIHI/wFHF = 0.6 and κ = 1
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Figure 1: Labor Supply and Income Profile by Sectors
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Figure 2: Labor Force Participation Rate and Lifetime Labor Supply of Informal SectorWorkers
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Figure 3: Average Intervivos Transfers Before and After
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